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ABSTRACT
In the 1830s and 1840s, the Whig and Democratic parties 
were distinct, cross-sectional parties with loyal followers. 
Because slavery had the potential to create rifts between the 
North and South, Jacksonian politics, stressed party loyalty over 
sectional loyalty. While antebellum politicians often debated 
the future of slavery, it was common practice to address slavery 
as part of larger party questions.
The annexation of Texas is one example of an issue that 
had clear ties to the future of slavery, yet was determined as a 
party question. Politicians focused the debate away from 
slavery to economic issues, the role of the government, and the 
constitutionality of annexation. By doing so, they hoped to 
strengthen cross-sectional political parties which tended to 
unify the country as a whole.
Partisan newspapers played an active role in antebellum 
politics and the debate over annexation. In. Richmond, Virginia, 
each party published an influential, widely read party paper.
The Richmond Enquirer promoted the Democratic party and 
annexation. The Richmond Whig championed the Whig, party and 
opposed annexation. The purpose of this thesis is to use 
partisan papers to demonstrate Virginia politicians' attempts to 
frame annexation in broad party terms, not as sectional issues. 
In the end, however, the underlying association between slavery 
and annexation fixed each party's reputation in the minds of 
Southern voters. This association undermined the second 
American party system. Thus, the debate over annexation 
foreshadowed the sectionalism that would lead to the Civil War.
v
VIRGINIA PARTY POLITICS AND TEXAS ANNEXATION
2Introduction
From 1843 to 184 6, the question of the annexation of 
Texas, a slaveholding republic more than four times as large in 
area as Virginia, threatened to divide the nation along 
sectional lines.1 President John Tyler pursued Texas as a means 
to establish a popular base of support that would re-elect him 
in 1844. Tyler, hoped that annexation would garner voters and 
either make the Southern-controlled Democratic party accept him 
or help catalyze a third party with him at the helm. Tyler 
hoped that politicians would not respond along traditional party 
lines. But, as the annexation debate gained momentum, 
politicians united behind their parties to support or oppose the 
movement. The strategy of refusing to address the question of 
slavery as the central point of contention appealed to both 
parties when they framed the question of the annexation of 
Texas. During the debate over Texas annexation, Southern 
politicians continued to focus on party rhetoric and issues 
other than slavery raised by expansion in order to limit debate 
over slavery on the national level.
1Frank L. Owsley, "The Pattern of Migration and Settlement in the 
Southern Frontier," in The South: Old and New Frontiers, ed. Harriet C. 
Owsley (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1969), p. 15. Texas
contains 175, 587, 840 acres while Virginia has 39, 262, 720 acres.
Because of its link to slavery, annexation was a good 
candidate to create discord between sections and between 
political parties.2 Politicians faced the dilemma of 
maintaining cross-sectional party appeal without completely 
alienating themselves from their own sections. Through the end 
of 1845., ideological divisions between Whigs and Democrats 
continued to govern Southern political behavior.3 As the 
beliefs of the two parties were different to begin with, it 
naturally followed that they had different plans for keeping the 
debate from becoming too sectional and for approaching 
annexation in a manner consistent with their party ideology.
Both Virginia Whigs and Democrats promoted the idea that 
the expansion of slavery need not be a concern for their 
respective Northern allies, but again, each took a slightly 
different approach. Because they supported annexation,
Democrats had to persuade Northern allies that the issue was not 
slavery or southern power, but rather that annexation was in the 
interest of the Union as a whole. They asserted that Texas, "As 
an integral party of the Union [will] greatly enhance the value 
of its exports, and at the same time afford a most valuable 
market for the mechanical and agricultural production of the 
North and West."4
2Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 41.
3David. M. Dunning, The Southern Perception of the Trans- 
Mississippi West, 1845-1853 (University of Illinois, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
1995), p. ix.
4Richmond Enquirer, 27 December 1844.
4The Whigs opposing annexation did not have to placate 
their northern wing, but rather had to assure southern members 
that their best interests lay in refusing Texas. Ultimately, 
the southern Whigs insisted
that we have not taken ground against the 
future and ultimate acquisition of this country to 
the United States. ...What we have contended for was, 
that Texas should not be instantly annexed, in 
violation of national faith, and our treaty 
stipulations with Mexico, before the people of the U.
States had had time to reflect, and to accomplish 
speculative ends of land mongers and political 
aspirants.5
Advocating gradual annexation allowed the question to remain 
open-ended, thereby retaining both northern and southern 
support, the Whigs hoped.
During the life of the second party system, the debate 
over slavery surfaced more and more frequently despite 
politicians' desire to focus on economic concerns and Henry 
Clay's American System as the key political issue. The Texas 
issue crowded out economic discussions in newspapers for the 
first time in 1844 and as in the past, politicians tried to 
relegate concerns about slavery to the second tier of 
importance.6 This strategy was mostly successful regarding 
Texas, though the debate over that same issue nonetheless showed 
the potential of slavery to undermine national party unity*
An examination of the newspaper debate on the issue in one 
southern city, Richmond, Virginia, reveals that the South was
5Richmond Whig, 12 April 1844.
6William J. Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, 1828- 
1856 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press, 1.978), p. 195.
5not unanimous in its support for annexation and that partisan 
divisions .influenced voting on the issue. Expansion was not 
viewed by the South strictly in terms of preserving of slavery. 
The debate in the Richmond Enquirer and the Richmond Whig during 
the push for annexation illustrates the shift in the political 
arena from economic matters and the role of the government to 
the politics of slavery because, no matter how hard politicians 
tried, Texas attracted attention as'a slavery-related issue.
The efforts of party controlled newspapers to keep the slavery 
issue submerged as in the past illuminate the conflict over 
Texas annexation as evidence of the increasing difficulty to 
contain potential sectional conflict over slavery within 
traditional political channels.7
7Lex Renda, "Retrospective Voting and the Presidential election of 
1844: The Texas Issue Revisited." Presidential Studies Quarterly
XXIV(Fall 1994), p. 838.
6Chapter I 
John Tyler and The Party System
The annexation of Texas is often seen as evidence of the 
sectional conflict that was a major cause of the Civil War. 
Although slavery clearly influenced the tactics of Southern 
politicians, the larger strategy of party politics attempted to 
keep the "peculiar institution" a secondary issue. Although 
slavery did enter the debate over annexation, it did not produce 
the sharp sectional divisions between slave and non-slave states 
that emerged in the 1850s.8
Party conflict, not sectional conflict, characterized 
United States history from roughly the 1820s through the 
introduction of the Wilmot Proviso to Congress in 184 6. The Age 
of Jackson precipitated the growth of two national, cross- 
sectional parties, the Democrats and the Whigs. Democratic and 
Whig politicians forged distinct ideologies and preserved cross- 
sectional alliances by concentrating on issues like the tariff, 
National Bank, internal improvements, and the role of the 
federal government. For example, the Democratic party regularly 
opposed the bank and concluded that,. "It is sufficient to say of 
a National Bank, that it has no warrant in the Constitution
8Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 1.
7itself."9 Democrats also generally opposed protective tariffs. 
They asserted that the idea that "high duties make low prices" 
was a Whig fallacy.10 Whigs, on the other hand, sought to 
resurrect the National Bank. Opposed to the expansion of 
presidential power, Whigs declared themselves "united in 
introducing a thorough reform, in cutting down Executive power 
and patronage, in turning out faithless office-holders, in 
putting a stop to the plunder of the Public."11
The parties concentrated on issues seemingly unrelated to 
slavery partly because they cared deeply about those issues and 
partly because they hoped to bury slavery as a national concern. 
Southern antebellum politicians thus tried to address political 
events in a national framework. The Democratic party defended 
states' rights and strict construction of the Constitution. 
Democrats were proponents of a small, well-run government and a 
free play of economic forces. But the Whigs were Madisonian 
nationalists and proponents of broad construction. They favored 
distribution of federal funds for internal improvements, public 
education, and the American system, and could be induced to 
support a protective tariff as long as their region stood to 
profit.12 Both parties concurred that the expansion of the 
United States drew attention to the issue of slavery.
9Richmond Enquirer, 16 April 1841.
10Richmond Enquirer, 12 April 1844.
i:LRichmond Whig, 12 February 1841 and 24 February 1841.
12William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion: Virginia and 
the Second Party System, 1824-1861 (Charlottesville, VA: University of
Virginia Press, 1996), pp. 228, 245, 248-249; Joel Silbey, The Shrine of
The two-party system was strong in Virginia. While the 
voting population was evenly distributed between the Democrats 
and Whigs, the Democratic party usually controlled the 
legislature.13 Partisanship dominated the assembly from the mid- 
1830s through the 1840s when the two parties put forth competing 
agendas and defined contested issues differently. Virginia 
politicians acted much like politicians in other states. In the 
assembly, major national issues defined the differences between 
the parties. Whigs supported measures to spend tax revenue, 
while Democrats were likely to advocate retrenchment and 
reform.14
Southern politicians defended slavery when the issue 
emerged, but party informed the way in which they defended it.'15 
Democrats usually accepted the positive good argument for 
defending slavery while Whigs were likely to support conditional 
emancipation at some future point.16 More often than not, debate 
over the peculiar institution centered on the effects of slavery 
on the state-such as altering the center of political and 
economic power- rather than how to eliminate' the system. A key 
concern for slave-holding Virginians was the security of their
property rights— human capital in this case.17 Despite these
Party; Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852 (University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 27-28.
13John Edward Buck, Virginia and the Mexican War (M.A. Thesis, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1965), p. 8.
14Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, pp. 186-189
15Cooper, South and the Politics of Slavery, p. 105.
16Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 194
9particularly southern concerns, Virginia politicians understood 
the desirability of maintaining a northern alliance.
Cooperation between the northern and southern factions of 
parties was necessary to insure that national power would 
protect the South and slavery. Northerners needed southern 
support to gain national political power, which provided the 
incentive for them to cooperate. As a result, it was 
advantageous for both northerners and southerners to keep the 
slavery question out of Congress and national debate. The 
potential fracturing of delicate alliances encouraged 
politicians to repress the issue of slavery as neither section 
could afford to alienate the other for fear of losing national 
power.
The opportunity to annex the Republic of Texas first arose 
when Texas declared independence from Mexico in 1836.
Democratic Presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren 
ignored annexation overtures from the newly independent Texan 
government, because they recognized the sectional danger 
annexation represented. During their presidencies, they saw no 
way to make the issue palatable to the Democratic party as a 
whole. In order to preserve the unity of the party and not risk 
losing power to the rival Whigs, Jackson flatly refused to 
consider annexation. His motive was to guarantee the election 
of Martin Van Buren.18 Van Buren also chose to avoid the 
question for, like Jackson, he recognized the potential for a 
clash between the sections of the Union over the issue of
17Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 262.
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slavery.19 The issue lay dormant until John Tyler resurrected it 
during his presidency.
John Tyler was not elected to the office of President of 
the United States. In 1840, the Whig party nominated him as 
William Henry Harrison's running-mate in order to placate 
Southern Whigs who wanted a supporter of states' rights. Tyler 
was a states' rightist and former Virginia Senator who, unlike 
John C. Calhoun, was not so identified with Southern interests 
that the North objected to him. Although the Whigs purposely 
nominated Tyler to the vice-presidency, they did not anticipate 
his ascension to the presidency. When President Harrison fell 
ill and died a mere month after his inauguration, the office 
fell into the lap of "His Accidency," John Tyler. The Whig 
party expected that he would act. in ways consistent w.ith their 
platform and take cues from their powerful leader, Senator Henry 
Clay. In fact, Tyler received enthusiastic support from the 
Richmond Whig, which proclaimed, "John Tyler is now elevated to 
the head of the Whig Party and the American People. ...That he 
will worthily discharge it— that he will pursue with unfaltering
Of)
step the good of the country—we have no shadow of a, doubt."
The Whig party's optimism was matched by much anticipation 
from the Democrats. Thomas Ritchie and Virginian Democrats 
demanded to know if Tyler "will carry out the Whig measures, or 
will he recollect the Virginia.State Rights' principles to which
18Cooper, South and the.Politics of Slavery, p. 182.
19Merk, Slavery and the Annexation of Texas (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1972), p. 6.
20Richmond Whig, 6 April 1841.
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he was formerly devoted?"21 Pessimistic Democrats predicted that 
"we have now more to fear than to hope from the Acting President 
of the United States."22 The Democrats had less to fear than
they anticipated. Tyler struck out on his own and vetoed two
successive bank charter bills; a national bank was the pet 
project of Whig leader Henry Clay and enjoyed strong party 
support. By the end of 1841, Tyler had become a President 
without a party. Dumped by the Whigs and shunned by the 
Democrats, Tyler turned his-attention toward Texas.
There is evidence that John Tyler had designs on
resurrecting the Texas question early in his tenure as President 
of the United States. Tyler's son and biographer Lyon G. Tyler 
mentions an 1841 meeting between Virginia Representative Henry 
Wise and the new president in which Tyler referred to annexation 
as the all-important goal of his administration. Further 
evidence of Tyler's early interest is provided in a letter to 
Daniel Webster dated October 11, 1841. Referring to annexation, 
he asked Webster, "Could anything throw so bright a lustre 
around us?"23 Though the issue had been avoided by previous 
administrations, Tyler looked at Texas with interest.
Undaunted by the potential disruption annexation 
presented, Tyler proved to be a southerner committed to pursuing 
policies that benefited his section.24 With the 18 41 re-election
21Richmond Enquirer, 6 April 1841.
22Richmond Enquirer, 23 April 1841.
23Lyon G. Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers (New York: 
DeCapo Press, 1970), Vol. 2: 254.
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of pro-annexation Samuel Houston as President of the Republic of 
Texas, the time for a treaty was ripe. Furthermore, having been 
dropped by both parties, "His Accidency" was anxious to 
successfully navigate an issue that would redeem his 
administration.25
Tyler presented annexation as a national issue. Although 
Tyler and his supporters claimed Texas was not a partisan issue, 
the lack of support from the Whigs made it clear he would have 
to seek support from the Democratic party.25 To do so, Tyler 
employed a two-tiered strategy. First, he stressed the 
possibility of a vulnerable Texas to fall prey to "some 
ambitious foreign power," more, specifically, to Great Britain.27 
Second, he highlighted the: economic benefits for both the North 
and the South that, according to him, were sure to follow 
annexation,. Tyler asserted that the acquisition of Texas was a 
matter of national security and economic prosperity for the 
whole country.
A letter published in the Madisonian, the Tyler organ, 
outlines the strategy of Tyler's annexation campaign. The 
letter, which appeared unexpectedly on January 23, 18 43, was 
written by Virginia Congressman and Tyler supporter Thomas W.
24 Robert Sobel, Conquest and Conscience: The 1840s (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971), pp. 224-225.
25Arthur M. Schlesinger, ed., History of American Presidential 
Elections, 1789-1968: Vol I. 1789-1844 (Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 
Vol 1: p. 759. In Letters and Times of the Tylers, Lyon G. Tyler 
asserts that until 1843 J. Tyler hoped to return to the Whig fold/ but 
once he realized that Henry Clay was too strong, he turned his attention 
to the Democratic Party.
26Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, Vol. 2: 27 8.
27Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, Vol. 2: 271.
13
Gilmer. In an effort to give the issue a national flavor,
Gilmer asserted that Texas would provide an open market for 
manufacturers and the agricultural surplus of non-slaveholding 
states. Moreover, while the South might face increased 
agricultural competition, reaffirming continental destiny was in 
the best interest of the whole country. For those who feared 
annexation was directly linked to the expansion of slavery, 
that, too, need not be a concern, as long as the status of 
slavery was left to be decided by each individual state. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of Louisiana and Florida had set 
the Constitutional precedent for annexing Texas.28
Tyler and his supporters insisted that, ..failure to annex 
Texas invited foreign interference on our borders, a potential 
threat to national security and economic well-being. In its 
struggle to maintain independence, Texas had experienced 
economic depression and built up a large national debt, making 
it susceptible to outside influence. Inspired by the supposed 
vulnerability of Texas, Thomas Gilmer presented a potential 
scenario in his letter to the Madisonian: Great Britain offered
Texas a loan with the condition that Texas not agree to be 
annexed to the United States, in effect becoming a colony of 
Britain. Tyler himself pointed to the coincidental timing of 
the retirement of Secretary of State Daniel Webster, the 
statesman who persistently negotiated the terms of the Webster- 
Ashburton treaty which settled the boundary between Maine and 
Canada, and the rapid workings of British influence upon the
28Merk, Slavery and Annexation, pp. 8-9.
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destiny of Texas.29 His claims seemed to be substantiated, for 
even as Congress entertained a.joint resolution for Texas 
annexation, Texas allowed Great Britain and France to propose a 
plan to coerce Mexico into recognizing Texas' independence as 
long as Texas pledged never to annex itself to the United 
States.30 An alliance between foreign powers and Texas, 
annexationists claimed, threatened the United States politically 
and economically. Tyler believed that demonstrating British 
intentions to influence Texas would weaken opposition to 
annexation.31
Despite the administration's attempts to frame annexation 
in terms of national security to gain support for annexation, 
the issue became linked to the spread of slavery. In an effort 
to depict Great Britain as a threat, the President released a 
report of British intrigue submitted by his unofficial aide,
Duff Green. Green portrayed the British threat to United 
States's power in the form of British abolitionists who promoted 
the end of slavery in the United States. The publication of 
Lord Aberdeen's remarks to Texas abolitionist Pearl Andrews that 
Britain intended to "encourage abolition in Texas" bolstered 
this unintended shift of focus to slavery.32 Aberdeen further 
substantiated the British.anti-slavery stance t h r ough his August
29Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers,. Vol. 2: 271.
30Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers,. Vol. 2: 335. Anson 
Jones replaced Sam Houston as president before the charge at Paris was 
given the authority to enact this plan.
31 Kinley J. Brauer, Cotton Versus Conscience, Massachusetts Whig 
Politics and Southwestern Expansion, 1843-1848 (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 58.
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18, 1843, remark to parliament that the "British public and
government hoped to see the abolition of slavery in Texas and 
everywhere else."33 Slavery gained further attention after a 
letter from Secretary of State John C. Calhoun to British 
Ambassador Richard Pakenham, containing a rousing defense of 
slavery, was made public.34 The administration caused many to 
associate annexation with the expansion of slavery instead of 
finding annexation essential to national security.
Negotiations for an annexation treaty took place out of 
the public eye, but annexation became a heated public issue in 
late 18 43 when it became clear that Tyler intended to present 
the Senate with a treaty for ratification. Tyler and a small 
circle of states' rights theorists and pro-slavery, southern 
sectionalists had devoted the second half of his term to the 
acquisition of Texas in hopes of rallying enough support to win 
the election. These . Tylerites, atypical Whigs who were not even 
standard Virginia Whigs (Virginia being Tyler's home state), did 
not represent the position of the rest of the. party.35
Tyler sent the negotiated treaty to the Senate on April 
22, 1844 . The treaty met with, plenty of opposition, including 
that of Virginia Whig William S. Archer. He stood before the 
Senate and proclaimed,
32Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, Vol. 2: 27 6.
33Merk, Slavery and Annexation, p. 23.
34Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York: The Baker
and Taylor Co., 1911), p. 201.
35Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 247.
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If, then, this was decided to be the election 
presented to us— annexation in the circumstances of 
this treaty—by this treaty now, or annexation never— 
if this were truly the real question— now or never, 
was there room for hesitation? No! The loud 
exclamation! Let it go out from this hall— resound 
through this land— reverberate from Texas—Never! oh, 
never!
The treaty was blocked on June 8, 1844, by a coalition of Whigs
and conservative Democrats.37 Consequently, annexation became a 
major issue during the 18 4 4 presidential election and was 
ardently debated in partisan newspapers.
Two such newspapers were Richmond Whig and the Richmond 
Enquirer, the most widely read political journals in the 
commonwealth of Virginia.38 Richmond was the political hub of a 
state with active politicians and a heritage of national 
political involvement. The Enquirer and the Whig were not only 
the party organs for the state of Virginia, but each paper was 
headed by a man who was prominent within the party on state and 
national levels. The popular press was unabashedly partisan and 
editors played crucial roles as party leaders.39
The Richmond Enquirer was the Democratic paper edited and 
published by Thomas Ritchie. Ritchie, with his many close 
connections to Democratic politicians, intended the paper to be
^ Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 1st sess., App. (1843-44), pp.
693-696., cited in Frederick Merk, Slavery and Annexation, p. 81.
37Arthur M. Schlesinger, History of Presidential Elections, Vol. 1: 
p. 773; Frederick Merk, Slavery and Annexation, p. 81. The treaty was 
rejected 35-16. Twenty-seven out of twenty-eight Whigs opposed it and 
fifteen out of twenty-two Democrats supported it.
38Elizabeth R. Varon, "We Mean to be Counted": White Women and 
Politics in Antebellum Virginia (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 
1993), p. 252.
17
"a vigorous Democratic journal, in view of the importance of 
Virginia to the Democratic party, and the tastes- of. the Virginia 
voters."40 John H. Pleasants edited the Richmond Whig. Its Whig 
sentiments were not only clear in its columns, but were also 
regularly refuted by the Enquirer. The existence of two 
ideologically opposed papers in itself illustrates the vigor of 
partisan divisions within the South, and specifically in the 
state of Virginia, divisions that fundamentally structured the 
debate over Texas.
39William G. Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 99.
40Robert W. Hughes, Editors of the Past (Richmond, VA: Wm. Ellis 
Jones, Book and Job Printer, 1897), p..7.
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Chapter II
The Richmond Enquirer:
"We go for Annexation, Immediate Annexation"
Thomas Ritchie was born in Tappahannock, the old 
commercial center of Virginia. The Ritchie family was related 
to the Roane and Brockenbrough families of Virginia, prominent 
Virginia politicians and businessmen. After dabbling in various 
other professions, Ritchie began his publishing career with the 
encouragement of Thomas Jefferson. He published the first issue 
of the Richmond Enquirer on May 9, 1804. From the outset, party 
patronage influenced the temper of the paper. Ritchie, like the 
Democratic party he was a member of, opposed a strong central 
government. He also consistently supported states' rights. In 
late 1831, in the wake of the debate over slavery following the 
Nat Turner rebellion, Ritchie actively participated in the 
discussion regarding the future of slavery but he clearly 
believed that the issue should be decided only by Southerners.41 
Throughout his tenure at the Democratic Enquirer, Ritchie 
published a consistently states' right paper. Although he never
41Allison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution, The 
Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1982), p. 86.
19
held public office and avoided the spotlight, he was recognized 
as the undisputed leader of the Richmond Junto.42
The Richmond Junto, a loosely knit alliance of Democratic 
politicians and prominent members of Virginia society, led the 
Jacksonian movement in Virginia. Members, including Peter V. 
Daniel, Andrew Stevenson, William H. Roane, Richard E. Parker, 
John Brockenbrough, and Philip N. Nichols, are credited with 
maintaining the Virginia Democratic party's loyalty to Andrew 
Jackson and Martin Van Buren through the early 1840s. Adhering 
to the principles of states' rights but desiring a strong 
federal union, this semi-formal organizing committee oversaw 
presidential elections and party discipline and corresponded 
with national party leaders. They were even accused of viewing 
themselves as the "power behind the throne."43
The Junto ensured that Virginia never cast her vote for a 
Whig presidential candidate.44 In fact, even in 1840 when 
Virginia-born Whig William Henry Harrison won the presidential 
election, Virginia still voted Democratic. When the Whig hinted 
that the Democrats should concede the state as lost, the Junto 
mouthpiece predicted correctly, albeit with great estimation of 
their own influence,. "We entertain a confident belief that 
Virginia will not vote, for Harrison. ...So far from knowing that
42Wade L. Shaffer, The Richmond Junto and Politics in Jacksonian 
Virginia (Ph.D. Dissertation, College of William and Mary, 1993), p. 11.
^ Richmond Whig, 19 February 1841.
44Shaffer, Richmond Junto, pp. 2-9.
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she will go for Gen. Harrison, we most confidently believe, that 
she will go for Mr. Van Buren by a strong majority."45
Ritchie's talent lay in the art of compromise and 
conciliation. His efforts for party unity served to hold 
together elements of the anti-slavery and protectionist North 
with the generally pro-slavery and free trade South, 
particularly during the 1840 presidential election.46 Although 
Ritchie was successful in preserving the Albany Regency/Richmond 
Junto partnership to give Van Buren Virginia in the 18.36 and 
1840 elections, after the 1840 election the Junto's power began 
to fade. The increasing prominence of the question of slavery 
in Virginia politics, which Ritchie and the Junto had tried to 
keep out of public debate, undermined their ability to maintain 
cross-sectional party unity.47 This erosion of national unity 
caused their local support to weaken as well.
Expansionist sentiment among Democrats made the Democratic 
party a logical proponent of the proposed annexation. Southern 
Democrats had promoted the idea of continental destiny for 
decades. A "more perfect union" would evolve with a continually 
expanding frontier, an idea that arose from the tradition of 
American exceptionalism.48 The spread of republican values and 
greater economic success would follow a.s the size of the United
45Richmond Enquirer, 29 October 184 0.
46Charles H. Ambler, Thomas Ritchie; A Study in Virginia Politics 
(Richmond, VA: Bell Book & Stationary Co., 1913), p. 218.
47Shaffer, Richmond Junto, p. 23
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States increased. The Democratic party was the party of 
Manifest Destiny.49
Democrats in Congress argued that the American federal 
system provided a flexible government capable of indefinite 
growth. The federal system of government left control of local 
affairs such as slavery in the hands of individual states and 
allowed the building of a large nation without central tyranny.50 
To gain the support of states' rights politicians, Democrats 
argued that expansion increased the federal nature of the 
government and actually moved the government away from 
centralized power; authority over wide areas was not thus a 
threat to states' rights ideals. 51
A real threat to the nation, claimed the Democratic party, 
was the activity of Great Britain on the country's southern 
border. With Great Britain pursuing relations with Texas, they 
reasoned, the United States must act or risk having a 
neighboring independent republic competing for economic ties 
with Britain. Even, ex-president Andrew Jackson supported that 
argument. He wrote a letter for publication advocating 
annexation based on the threat of a Texas/Britain alliance.52 
Furthermore, either an independent or British-dominated Texas
48:Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Designs: Anxious Aggrandizement in
Late Jacksonian America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 
257.
49Merk, Manifest Destiny, p. 27. The actual term "Manifest 
Destiny" was coined by John L. O'Sullivan in an editorial on the Texas 
issue in the Democratic Review for July and August, 1845, although 
variations of the same idea were used before that.
50Merk, Manifest Destiny, p. 26.
51Dunning, Southern Perception, p. .72.
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could thwart Manifest Destiny by creating a barrier between the 
United States and the Pacific Coast. Clearly,, from the party's 
viewy, this outcome was unacceptable.
Expansionist Southern Democrats also asserted that 
annexing Texas would not increase the power of slave states.
Most Democrats suggested that the line of the Missouri 
compromise prevented slave, states' power from growing too 
quickly. Democratic Congressman Thomas Bayly from Virginia's 
Eastern Shore, among others, pointed out that, "The Missouri 
'surrender' had thrown the larger portion of territory to the 
free states making Northern predominance a future certainty." 
There was no longer an issue to be made out of the balance of 
power between the North and South.53 Virginia Democratic 
Congressman George Dromgoole- suggested that 36'30" should "stand 
forever, and put an end to this question."54 The Richmond 
Enquirer insisted that "There is but one course for every true 
Southern man— stand on the Missouri Compromise line."55 In the 
words of one historian, "Most pro-annexation Southerners 
accepted this as the sine qua non on the slavery question, 
although their embrace of it ran from ardent to decidedly icy."56
After: John Tyler raised the issue of annexation, Southern 
Democrats more vehemently justified annexation in terms of 
national security. Many of their arguments followed the
52Richmond Enquirer, 2 April 1844.
53Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 102.
54Richmond Enquirer, 01 February 1845.
55Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 101.
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reasoning of the letter written by Robert J. Walker of 
Mississippi. The Walker letter appeared in the Enquirer over 
the course of two issues, May 24 and May 28, 1844. It had been 
printed for the first time in February by the Washington Globe. 
Senator Walker asserted that annexation should be supported 
based: on several considerations. In 183 6, the Republic of Texas 
had voted for annexation, so the question of support on their 
end had long been settled. The United States acquired Texas'as 
part of the Louisiana purchase, he asserted, and to refuse 
annexation was to deny the wisdom of the original purchase. The 
cession of Texas to Spain by the 1819 Adams-Onis Treaty 
violated the treaty of 1803 and was therefore an error.
Texas was a potential threat to United States security if 
she were not annexed, which should be easy to do since most of 
her citizens were former Americans, Walker continued. The 
growth from thirteen to 2 6 states had only strengthened the 
Union so, naturally, the addition of Texas would increase the 
prosperity of every American and bind the country closer 
together. Slavery should not present a problem, Walker 
insisted; in fact, Texas would improve the situation. The soil 
in the South was worn out, so instead of an increase in 
population, there would be a shift, draining slaves away from 
the border commonwealths, eventually to Mexico and Central and 
South America, relieving the nation of the burden of an enslaved 
class. Refusal to annex Texas left the door open for a 
potential alliance between Great Britain and Texas, or could 
force Southern and Southwestern states to secede and ally with
56Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 101.
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Texas. Walker concluded that "this great measure is essential 
to the security of the South, the defence of the West, and 
highly conducive to the welfare and perpetuity of the whole 
Union. "57
The Enquirer used arguments based on party ideology to 
support annexation. It emphasized the link between Northern and 
Southern Democrats on the issue to reaffirm the idea that 
annexation was a national, not a sectional, issue. The October 
12, 1844, edition assured readers that Northern Democrats
favored annexation more strongly than Southern Whigs.58 Party 
ideology, not narrow sectionalism, underlay Democratic pro- 
annexation, the paper insisted, since annexation had the support 
of both must northern and southern Democrats. In the November 
5, 1844, issue, a most pointed message urged voters to the polls 
to support James K. Polk for president and all other Democratic 
candidates because
...they stand forth as the advocates of those 
great national measures, the Annexation of Texas and 
the Occupation of Oregon, which sectional prejudices 
and petty party feelings alone prevent being carried 
by acclamation. They are for making our Republic 
really independent of all the rest of the world, 
while our opponents are willing to see Texas thrust 
away from our threshold and Great Britain encircling 
us with her territories, by seizing on Oregon in 
addition to her Canadian possessions, and reducing 
Texas to a state of commercial vassalage to her .59
^ Richmond Enquirer, 24 May, 28 May, 1844, reprinted from the 
Washington Globe, 03 February 1844.
58Richmond Enquirer, 12 October 1844.
S 9Richmond Enquirer, 05 November 1844.
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This passage illustrates the Democratic paper's invocation of 
patriotism to make the point that annexation was a national 
issue of equal concern to North and South because of the threat 
of foreign interference. The paper purported to decry partisan 
appeals on the issue as well as sectional polarization. Ritchie 
insisted that "we do not desire to see this great subject
converted to a sectional question, nor do we entertain the
foolish design of attempting to make it so."60 Annexation 
reflected the interest of the nation and merited unanimous 
support from both parties, and especially from all Democrats.
The language of this passage also suggests Democratic fear
for national safety. It was important for the United States to
hold competing foreign powers at bay, or the country would never 
be secure as a major power. The United States was independent 
and so was. Texas. No less of a power than Great Britain had 
recognized the independence of the latter. To procrastinate was 
dangerous. Not only did the United States risk the safety of 
the whole union and jeopardize the governmental system, but 
wavering on admitting Texas invited foreign interference on our 
Southern border. In those terms, annexation became a point of 
national pride and as a means of securing international 
standing.
In November 18 44, with the election as President of pro­
annexationist James K. Polk who carried Virginia by a margin of 
six thousand votes, Democrats increasingly saw annexation as a 
litmus test. In January, 1845, Ritchie printed a letter from a
60Richmond Enquirer, 05 May 1844.
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reader calling for a Democratic Senator. Virginia was entitled 
to pro-annexation representation because "if you look to numbers 
alone, she is [Democratic] by about six thousand majority."61 
Annexation was identified as a party issue, therefore Virginia 
needed a Democrat in order to make sure her true opinion was 
heard. This assertion was reinforced when the paper stated that 
it expected Whigs in the South and West to vote along party 
lines in the January House votes on the Texas question.62
After Polk's victory, Ritchie's Enquirer again espoused 
cross-sectional unity when it stated that "Democrats in the 
North and South are the same; they act together for the great 
purpose of preserving our free institutions." As for the future 
of slavery, Ritchie endorsed Walker's diffusion thesis and 
claimed that "Texas would be the door through which the negro 
race of the United States would ultimately pass."63 The Enquirer 
mirrored the Democratic sentiment that slavery was best left out 
of further debate, sharply criticizing those who continued to 
oppose annexation based on fears of the expansion of slavery. 
Virginia Democrats favored "setting aside the subject of 
slavery, [which] ought not to be regarded— and every 
consideration of prudence, policy, justice and patriotism, seems 
to demand the reunion [of Texas and the United States] at the 
earliest practicable moment."64
61Richmond Enquirer, 03 January 1845.
62Richmond Enquirer, 07 January 1845.
63Richmond Enquirer, 27 December 1844.
64Richmond Enquirer, 27 December 1844.
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Virginia Democrats increasingly equated Whig sentiments 
with Northern, sectionalism. For example, Ritchie asserted in 
January, 1845: "The Richmond Whig outstrips its most ultra
Northern Federal allies, in its bitter opposition to the 
annexation of Texas." In the same article, the Enquirer 
recognized that party affiliation would affect resolutions 
passed by the state House of Delegates in regard to the question 
of annexation, and he hoped that the Whigs would "meet the 
question promptly, throw aside all their former party feelings, 
and strike one blow for their country."65 When a resolution 
barely passed the state Senate because of Whig opposition, the 
paper observed that Texas annexation was "now altogether a party 
question, even in Washington." When individual Whigs did cross 
party lines they were congratulated for rising above party.66 
Additionally, the paper commented on a pro-Texas resolution not 
passed in North Carolina because of the Whig vote, further 
illustrating the party influence on the issue.
In January 1845, the Enquirer also acknowledged that if 
slavery were made an issue, annexation might fail.67 As the 
annexation debate grew heated, the Democrats claimed that the 
South did not want to make slavery an issue but that the North 
did. Ritchie insisted that despite the efforts of Massachusetts 
and Connecticut in particular, "we, therefore, do not make the 
issue. It i s .forced upon us by the abolitionists— and we stand
65Richmond Enquirer, 14 January 1845.
66Richmond Enquirer, 2 8 January 1845.
^Richmond Enquirer, 17 January 1845.
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only upon self defence, in resisting an influence, to which, if 
we should how submit, on such ,a measure, we can perceive no 
stopping place." Virginia Democrats asserted that the Missouri 
Compromise had fixed the line between slave and free territory 
and that the free states had the best side of the bargain.68
In further support of expansion, there was an extended 
article on the "Fruits of the Annexation of Texas." It stressed 
that the Enquirer, and by extension, the Democrats, had always 
approached the issue of annexation from a national point of 
view. While acquiring Texas was important to protect the South 
from foreign intrigue, and even, the paper admitted, to protect 
slavery, annexation was really an extension of the voice of the 
people. That voice had been exercised by electing President 
Polk. More important, annexation was viewed with the future of 
the West and North in mind, too. The Enquirer insisted that 
Texas would provide a growing market for the staple products of 
the West and the manufactured goods of the North. For an 
independent Texas to infringe on United States trade relations 
with Great Britain would be equally damaging for Northern 
manufacturers and Southern planters.
The Democratic party used the pages of the Enquirer to 
champion annexation. In fact, the Whig accused its rival of 
printing months of "Texas first—Texas last— and Texas all the 
time."69 In his paper's defense, Ritchie stated that "if on 
occasion we have confined our attention almost exclusively to
68Richmond Enquirer, 04 February 1845.
69Richmond Whig, 05 February 1845.
the question of annexation, it is because it has [of late] 
assumed its imposing aspect."70 It had an imposing aspect 
because as a divisive, slavery-tinged topic occupying the 
national arena, annexation would determine the future success 
the Democratic party.
7°Richmond Enquirer, 10 May 1844.
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Chapter III
The Richmond Whig:
"We Can Assure the Public Texas will NOT be Annexed"
Whig publisher John Hamden Pleasants was Thomas Ritchie's 
chief editorial rival. Pleasants arrived in Richmond in 182 4 
from the Lynchburg Virginian, one of the papers in a 
"geographical crescent" that opposed the Richmond Enquirer, to 
assume the duties of editor at the Richmond Constitutional Whig, 
later the Richmond Whig.71 He continually denounced Ritchie and 
his Junto, playing on public fear of a body of men in the 
capital controlling political affairs.72 Like Ritchie's position 
at the Enquirer, the position at the. Whig was a political one.
In fact, historians have speculated that John Pleasants used his 
editorial powers to assist his father's political career.73
The Richmond Whig was the principal anti-Jackson paper in 
the Eastern part of Virginia.74 Pleasants supported Hugh Lawson 
White over the Democrat Martin Van Buren during the presidential
71F. Thornton Miller "The Richmond Junto— The Secret All-Powerful 
Club—or Myth" The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 99 
(January 1991), p. 70. The other areas of the "geographical crescent" 
were the Valley and Fredricksburg.‘
72Miller, "The Richmond-Junto," p. 74.
73William Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 84; Miller,
"The Richmond Junto," p. 71. James Pleasants, John's father, was a 
Virginia Senator and served as the commonwealth's governor.
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election of 1836.75 Through the pages of the Whig, Pleasants led 
Whig sentiment in Virginia and labored continually for harmony 
within the party. For example, in the 1840 election, party 
unity required that the states' rights faction of the Whig party 
yield. Virginia Whig judge Abel P. Upshur credited Pleasants 
with stifling Virginia Whigs' states' rights sentiment by 
"flagging everything like spirit out of the states'-rights
w  >/ 7 6m e n .
Nationally, the Whig party grew out of opposition, to 
Andrew Jackson and his supporters, who were eventually called 
the Democratic party. The Whig party viewed its ideal member as 
"one who prefers liberty to tyranny—who supports privilege 
against prerogative— the rights and immunities of the people, as 
ascertained by the equity of nature, the Constitution and laws 
of the country, against the predominance of the Crown, or 
Executive power."77 In the South, Whigs found strong support 
among merchants, lawyers, and journalists who operated in 
markets that served slaveholders.78 Whig beliefs, were compatible 
with those southern slaveowners who saw the key to preserving 
the institution in finding better markets for slavery-produced
74Henry H. Simms, The Rise of the Whigs in Virginia: 1824-1840 
(Richmond, VA: The William Byrd Press, Inc., 1929), p. 1:7.
75Simms, Rise of the Whigs, pp. 94-95
76A.P. Upshur to Judge N. Beverly Tucker, February 22, 1840, cited 
in Tyler, Life and Times of the Tylers, Vol. 2: 701-703; Arthur C. Cole, 
The Whig Party in the South (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1962), p. 88.
77Simms, Rise of the Whigs, p.. 86.
78William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p. 361.
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products, not necessarily in. the expansion of slavery. They 
believed in a republic limited in size, not a vast empire.
The Whigs feared that a large country necessitated a 
powerful central government under an executive with unlimited 
power and a formidable military, all conditions that threatened 
republicanism.79 If expansion was unavoidable, accession should 
come voluntarily and not through military might.80 The Whigs 
cautioned against a headlong rush to the Pacific. They promoted 
a gradual, orderly process to expand westward with the twin 
goals of avoiding war with other nations and eventually securing 
Pacific harbors. Fundamentally, they believed, rapid expansion 
threatened a republican way of life.
According to historian Drew McCoy, Whigs revised 
classical Republicanism to prefer, "expansion through time (the 
gradual spread of ideals) over expansion through space."81 
Virginian William C. Rives thought that the nation's then- 
existing boundaries, which stretched from ocean to ocean, 
contained "ample area for hundred millions of human beings." He 
asked, "Ought not this reconcile gentlemen to some little delay? 
Were we so pent in, so crowded for room, that we must burst 
through the barriers of the Constitution to get a little
79John H. Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and
Dissent, 1846-1848 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 
pp. 6-7.
80Schroeder, Mr. Polk's War, p. 28.
81Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in 
Jeffersonian Virginia (Chapel Hill, NC; University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980).
33
breathing space?"62 The domain of freedom, Whigs said, could be 
extended by other nations following the example of the United 
States, not necessarily by the United States controlling more 
land. This request for slower growth appeased potential 
supporters of the Whigs in the South because expansion in 
general was not unconditionally rejected, merely delayed.
The Virginia Whigs enjoyed a successful, if short, 
existence. The Whig party materialized in the wake of the 
nullification crisis and attracted many tidewater conservatives 
and states' rights advocates. Like the Democratic party, the
• « • • • A AVirginia Whigs considered themselves a party of the people. 
However, the Whigs built an the strong banking interests in the 
commonwealth and.were generally associated with the emerging 
bourgeoisie and cosmopolitans, most of whom were in the east.84 
They encompassed many conservative elements and property holders 
who believed that the control of wealth belonged with those who 
held the wealth.85 As a result, although they had statewide 
support, the Whigs are often seen as an Eastern Virginia party.86 
Still, the party's statewide appeal was illustrated by the 
closeness in Virginia of the 1836 presidential election between 
Democrat Martin Van Buren and Whig Hugh Lawson White.87
82Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 79.
83Cooper, South and the Politics of Slavery, pp. 26^2 9.
84Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 179; Simms, Rise of 
the Whigs, p . 12.
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Buck, Virginia and the Mexican War, p. 8.
While Virginia Whigs supported slavery, it was not on the 
same terms as the Democratic party. Some historians claim 
Democrats believed that the Democratic party existed to 
unconditionally preserve slavery.88 Virginia Whigs, however, 
viewed the protection of slavery in terms of the protection of 
the rights of white men to hold slave property.89 Whig ideology 
and views of the responsibility of the national government, and 
not only their interests as southerners, shaped their views on 
slavery.90 Therefore, in their own eyes, opposition to 
annexation did not equal opposition to slavery.
Whig papers were as heated and partisan.as the Democratic 
Richmond Enquirer. In the Richmond Whig, for example, John H. 
Pleasants based his opposition to annexation on party ideology,, 
just as the Enquirer cited its. party's position to support it. 
The first argument the Whig advanced was that annexation 
repudiated a treaty with Spain. While Texas had at one time 
belonged to the United States, the government had ceded it to 
Spain in 1819 in exchange for Florida. According to the Whig, 
saying "we want it again" did not provide ample reason to annex 
the land.91
As it became clear that the issue was not going to fade, 
the Whig proclaimed that the question was a "subject of gigantic
87Richard P. . McCormick, The Second American Party System (Chapel 
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 194.
88John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the 
Antebellum Republic (Cambridge University Press, 1995) Vol. 1: 324.
89Shade, Democratizing the Old Dominion, p. 13.
90Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 149.
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magnitude to the whole Union." Whigs referred to the United 
States as an "already overgrown territory." The Whigs' second 
concern was that there was no way to predict the effect of 
annexation on the Union or its institutions. William C. Rives 
warned that "the precedent^setting evils of violating the 
Constitution in order to secure-Texas annexation far outweighed 
any advantages the South might obtain." He also predicted that 
annexation would drain the slave population— and Whiggish 
slaveholders— from Virginia weakening Whig strength there, and 
would further collapse the glutted cotton market.92 For the good
* 93of the nation, he insisted, Virginia must oppose annexation. 
Ironically, the Democrats/ often thought as a pro-slavery party, 
determined that the draining of slaves from Virginia potentially 
preserved slavery in the South as a whole. Conversely, the 
Whigs, some of whom still had moral reservations about slavery, 
used the fear of weakening the institution in Virginia as 
grounds to oppose annexation..
Thirdly, the nation needed to determine the will of the 
people with a "clear, decided and unsectional majority." To set 
the precedent of annexation without public support was 
dangerous. The Enquirer, the Whig reported, asserted there was 
a mandate for annexation in Virginia, but in return, the Whig 
asked,
WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS MADE
UP ON THIS SUBJECT IN VIRGINIA? WHAT COUNTY, OR WHAT
91Richmond Whig, 02 January 1844 and 16 January 1845.
92Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 81; Schroeder, Mr.. Polk's War,
p. 7.
93Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 98.
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PUBLIC MEETING IN ANY COUNTY, HAS EXPRESSED ITS 
SENTIMENTS? WHEN WAS HER LEGISLATURE CALLED UPON TO 
DECIDE UPON THIS -MOMENTOUS QUESTION? WHEN WAS IT 
EVEN HINTED AT IN THAT BODY?94
The Whig also- supported the national Whig party's request for 
more cautious expansion, demanding more time to study the 
question.95 Clearly, the nation needed more time to consider the 
issue, given the many problems that the Democrats had not 
addressed or incorrectly evaluated.
Among the problems Democrats had created, according to 
Virginia Whigs, was that the United States had inappropriately 
initiated the idea of annexation to the Texan government. The 
Whig backed this up in the April 2, 1844, edition, citing an 
article from the Houston Telegraph stating the Texas 
administration's confirmation that the United States had indeed 
initiated the annexation overtures. Pleasants observed that 
begging for land was a "new and humiliating position for the 
United States to be placed in."96
The Whig party also differed from the Democratic party in 
their view of the threat Great Britain presented to the United 
States's constitutional destiny and economic security. The 
Democratic party's worries of an alliance between Texas and 
Great Britain were unfounded, Virginia Whigs asserted. As a 
republic, Texas despised monarchies and would never submit to 
one. Also, Great Britain would insist on abolishing slavery and
94Richmond Whig, 2 6 March 1844.
^Richmond Whig, 22 March 1844.
96Richmond Whig, 2 April 1844.
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Texas could not survive without it. Moreover, the Whigs 
believed that England had no real designs on Texas.97
Rather, Texas annexation was the product of desperate 
politicians and la,nd speculators and not in the best interest of 
the country. There was a conspiracy to annex Texas, the Whig 
asserted. As presidential hopefuls, John Tyler wanted to claim 
the glory of annexation and Democrat Martin Van Buren supported 
it to try to win Southern support. They were allied with 
speculators, land grabbers who would rush the proposal through 
to make money. John Pleasants and the Whigs were appalled that 
"such a proposition [was] unblushingly advanced, under the
influence of Texas pecuniary interests to the Senate of
Virginia itself," and hoped "that honorable body, without the 
least regard to party, and in defiance of party influence,
[would] spurn the proposition out of their Hall, never before so 
debased by a proposal so unjust."98 Once again, the Whig 
insisted that the people of the. nation, even in the Southern 
states, demanded more time be taken to examine the issue.99
Additionally, the Whig carried articles outlining the 
dangers of annexing Texas. It would mean assuming Texas's 
public debt of $10-20 million. The price of land in the rest of 
the country would fall so low that it would not be worth 
anything. The superabundance of agricultural production would 
compete with that of Virginia. This would affect the
" Richmond Whig, 22 March 1844.
" Richmond Whig, 10 January 1845.
"Richmond Whig, 05 April 1844.
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agricultural states and the wealth of the nation as a whole.100 
Furthermore, Pleasants asserted that there was no benefit from 
annexing Texas to the- South because annexation would glut the 
cotton market, and besides, the North would never let annexation 
pass because of. the issue of slavery. So, even while the Whig 
tried to stick to partisan economic issues, it could not ignore 
the lurking presence of slavery that threatened to sectionalize 
Texas annexation.
The desire to prevent annexation explains the relief 
voiced by the Whig when it announced that voters had elected 
Anson Jones, a man perceived to be opposed to annexation, to 
succeed Houston as President of Texas. With a leader who 
favored an independent Texas in office, surely the matter would 
be dropped.101 If the Democrats persisted in pursuing 
annexation, Pleasants insisted that "the Whigs [intended] to 
retain their self-respect [and ignore] the Enquirer's attempt to 
dragoon them into supporting Texas."102
100Richmond Whig, 10 October 1844.
101Richmond Whig, 19 October 1844.-
102Richmond Whig, 5 February 1845.
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Chapter IV 
The Joint Resolution
The election of 1844 marks the transition between the 
politics of Jacksonian America and that of. sectional 
controversy.1®3 Texas emerged as a defining issue after the 
Senate failed to ratify Tyler's treaty. Tyler himself declined 
to run after it became clear that the Democratic party would run
a pro annexation candidate. j-i.j. a uxym i__y w j. i ^ ov- >=; *-•. _i_ ^ ^  j. ±,
the Democratic party's expansionist policy handed it a solid 
victory in the South although with a national majority of only 
38, 000 votes.104
Ritchie's Enquirer promoted the Democratic party's 
position regarding annexation and the 1844 election. Virginia 
Democrats withdrew support for Martin Van Buren's presidential 
bid after he came out weakly for annexation. In early May the. 
Enquirer reprinted Van Buren's position letter in which he 
stated that, although Louisiana had set the precedent for the 
constitutionality of annexation, he did not support immediate 
annexation because, the situation between Mexico and Texas had 
yet to be. resolved, Mexico did not recognize Texas's
103Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics, 414.
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independence, and Great Britain presented only a minimal 
threat.105 Not long after the publication of those remarks, the 
Virginia Democratic Central Committee released its delegates to 
the Democratic National Convention from their instructions to 
support Van Buren's presidential bid, ostensibly in order to 
nominate an aggressively pro-annexation candidate.106 In fact,, 
the pages of the Enquirer were soon promoting a new candidate. 
Tennessee Democrat James K. Polk wrote for the benefit of the 
voters that he favored "the' immediate re-annexation of Texas to 
the territory and Government of the United States."107 Thomas 
Ritchie encapsulated the sentiment of the Virginia Democratic 
party when he asserted in his paper that "The annexation of 
Texas must be met."108
The southern branch of the Democratic party, with the 
support of a good fraction of Northerners, was in a unique 
position to set the platform for the majority party of the 
country.109 Ritchie's mandate for annexation and Martin Van 
Buren's refusal to support annexation unconditionally cost him 
the support of Virginia and other southern delegates.110 
Virginia delegates never cast a vote, for Van Buren's nomination
104Freehling, The Road to Disunion, p. 438; Sobel, Conquest and 
Conscience, p. 237.
1 OSRichmond Enquirer, 3 May 1844.
’Richmond Enquirer, May 1844.
Richmond Enquirer, 14 May 1844
108Cooper, South and the Politics of Slavery, p. 190, from the 
March 2 9, 1844, Richmond Enquirer.
109Freehling, The Road to Disunion, p. 42 9.
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and led the rally behind Polk as soon as his name was added to 
the ballot .111 As a result of southern, pressure, James Polk was 
elevated to the position of presidential candidate and 
subsequently voted into office. Polk's platform balanced 
Northern and Southern concerns by promising to "re-annex Texas" 
and to "re-occupy Oregon."112 His nomination meant that the 
Democrats favored annexation, and by implication, the spread of 
slavery, while Henry Clay and the Whigs tried to appeal to both 
supporters and opponents of annexation.113
Henry Clay had been the front-runner for the Whig
nomination since 18 41 and received near-unanimous support at the
nominating convention. Concerning annexation, it was a matter
of fine-tuning a platform to garner cross-sectional support.
Clay and the Whig party tried to appease the South by taking an 
equivocal stance against annexation without ruling it out 
completely. In a letter written on April 17, 1844, Clay stated, 
"I consider the annexation of Texas, without the assent of 
Mexico, as a measure compromising the national character, 
involving us certainly in a war with Mexico, probably with other 
Foreign Powers, dangerous to the integrity of the Union, 
inexpedient in the present financial conditions of the country,
110Schlesinger, 760; Cooper, South and the Politics of Slavery, p. 
199; Buck, Virginia and the Mexican War, p. 14.
1:uRichmond Enquirer, 28 May 1844, 4 June 1844.
112Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 65; Merk, Slavery and 
Annexation, p. 95.
113Sobel, Conquest and Conscience, p. 235.
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and not called for by any general expression of public 
opinion. "114
By insisting upon the need for Mexican cooperation, Clay 
absolved, himself from committing to immediate annexation, but 
left room for possible action. In the anticipation of 
annexation (presumably after receiving Mexican support), 
however, Clay took pains to address the issue of slavery. He 
reassured the North that Texas would not add strength to the 
South because only two of five prospective states that might be 
carved out of the territory of Texas had potential as slave 
states. The other three, which would fall west and north of San 
Antonio, would most likely remain free states because of soil 
and climate.
The Whig urged Virginian voters to do their duty and let 
the politicians remember "that we oppose a party who openly go 
for the annexation of Texas," and the "vilest of all 
propositions," paying the debt- of Texas.115 Despite their 
appeals, Polk ascended to_the presidency. The election in no 
way resolved the dangers of annexation. The Whig feared that 
despite the cross-sectional characters of both parties the Union 
would dissolve because the North and South would fight over the 
tariff, Texas, and slavery.116
Tyler interpreted Polk's election as a mandate for 
annexation and adopted a proposal made by both Mississippi
114Righmond Enquirer, 30 April 1844.
llsRichmond Whig, 29 October 1844.
116Richmond Whig, 15 November 1844.
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Democratic Senator R.J. Walker and South Carolina. Democratic 
Senator George McDuffie earlier in the year, to annex "Texas by a 
joint resolution of Congress.117 A joint resolution allowed 
Tyler to bypass the Senate, whose Whig majority would never give 
him the two-thirds vote necessary to ratify a treaty; he needed 
only a simple majority in each chamber to approve annexation.
His move met with disgust from Whigs, who noted with contempt 
that "the Power of Congress to annex a foreign power by joint 
resolution— is an absurdity— the discovery of which seems to have 
been reserved for this age of political empyricism and folly."118
As the joint resolution to annex Texas appeared before 
Congress, the Whig continued to denounce "reckless, immediate 
annexationists."119 Later that, month, the Whigs reiterated the 
idea that the United States had no right to claim Texas, 
especially since the United States still retained Florida, for 
which Texas had originally been traded.120
Southern Whigs further pointed out that unilateral 
annexation of a sovereign state was unconstitutional, and held 
that Tyler was invoking a dangerously loose construction of the 
Constitution when he proposed legislative annexation as the 
legal means to acquire Texas.121 Virginia Whigs reminded their 
opponents that it was the Constitution that provided the legal
117Richmond Enquirer, 28' May 1844; Tyler, Letters and Times of the 
Tylers, Vol. 2: 331.
118Richmond Whig, 8 February 1845.
119Richmond Whig, 03 January 1845.
120This refers back to the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 between the 
United States and Spain.
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safeguard for slavery and that any loose interpretation of that 
document threatened to set a precedent for extinguishing 
slavery. Opposing a joint resolution on Constitutional grounds 
as a tactic to block annexation appealed to Southerners who 
feared for the future of.slavery and to Northerners'who opposed 
expansion.
However, it was Whig Representative Milton Brown from 
Tennessee who proposed the terms of the accepted resolution. 
Texas would be admitted as five states whose boundaries were set 
by the United States. Residents in states formed below the 
Missouri Compromise line of 36'30" would determine the status of 
slavery; states above that line would be free states. Texas 
would retain its public lands and sell them to pay the public 
debt.122 In February, the Enquirer championed the Brown plan for 
annexing Texas. The paper stressed that the plan was based on 
the Constitution and that no. section of the country should be 
upset by its provisions. Both chambers approved the resolution 
on March 1, 1845. To secure his place in history, Tyler 
dispatched an invitation of statehood to Texas on March 3, the 
night before he was to hand over his powers to President-elect, 
James K. Polk.
Each Richmond newspaper reiterated its party's position on 
annexation after the passage of the resolution. The Enquirer 
and the Democrats were clearly pleased. The paper gleefully 
announced a "glorious result," which Ritchie said gave
121 •Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 138.
122Richmond Enquirer, 18 February 1845.
45
annexation supporters "a feather in their Caps." Party unity 
had been achieved as all the Democrats in the Senate, and all 
but two in the House, voted' for Texas.123
The Whigs, on the other hand, denounced Tyler as an "un­
crowned monarch." In the -Whig, Pleasants reprinted the words of 
a sympathetic party paper which bitterly noted that "the 
Annexation of Texas— the favorite hobby of Mr. Tyler— has 
succeeded in Congress, but at the expense of the Constitution." 
The only good news was that "the mean,, weak, ignoble, and 
corrupt administration of John Tyler is closed."124
The Enquirer and Whig show that the debate in Virginia 
surrounding the annexation of Texas did follow partisan 
ideology. While the issue of slavery was. recognized as a 
factor, politicians continued to downplay its importance in 
contrast to the larger issue of expansion. Virginia Whigs and 
Democrats debated the possibility of annexation using arguments 
that arose from party ideology and rhetoric and encompassed the 
issue of slavery within concerns such as the constitutionality 
of annexation that were less likely to ignite sectional 
division. Virginia politicians were successful; among Virginia 
congressmen, voting for.the joint resolution fell along strictly 
party lines. In the rest of Congress, only five Southern Whigs 
supported annexation, and only one southern Democrat joined the 
Whigs in opposition.125
10*3
Richmond Enquirer, 26 February 1845.
124Richmond Whig, 7 March 1845, reprinted from the New York Courier 
and Enquirer.
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After the passage of the annexation resolution, the 
Enquirer's attacks on the Whig newspapers grew increasingly 
bitter. On September 30, 18 45, the Enquirer accused the Whig
press in Virginia of trying to undermine the- confidence and 
ability of the current national administration because they 
continued to oppose Texas.126 In addition, Ritchie addressed the 
tendency of Whig editors to denounce the annexation as a 
"plundering scheme of territorial aggrandizement'' bound to bring 
about the downfall of the Republic. Pleasants and the Whigs, 
the Enquirer insisted, contradicted themselves if they supported 
the movement for Oregon and not that for Texas.127 The Enquirer 
proudly noted that "The annexation of Texas came about through 
high moral and political grounds."128
The result of Tyler's maneuvering was that an issue voted 
along party lines unleashed clear sectional undertones. The 
Democrats supported Texas and recaptured the Virginia General 
Assembly in the 1845 state elections. The Whigs hewed to their 
party line and lost representation in the Assembly.129 Before 
the 1844 presidential election, John Pleasants wrote, "If J.K. 
Polk prevails over Henry Clay, THE WHIG PARTY IS NO MORE!"130 
Perhaps he was accurate in his prediction. Historian William 
Cooper suggests that "because of Texas the divided, dispirited
125Dunning, Southern Perception, p. 96.
126Richmond Enquirer, 30 September 1845.
127Rjchmond Enquirer,. 18 November 1845.
128Richmond Enquirer, 09 October 1846.
129Freehling, The Road to Disunion, p. 427.
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Democrats became united and jubilant. Because of Texas the 
united, jubilant Whigs became, albeit more slowly, fragmented 
and dispirited."131
What Tyler had promoted as a national issue, albeit with 
clear southern motives, was determined along party lines with 
sectional repercussions. Ultimately, annexation affected the 
ways the parties presented their platforms in the 1844 
elections. While the Democrats experienced short-term success, 
annexation contributed to a growing resentment of Southern power 
that affected the Democratic party. Slavery forced the Whigs 
into an anti-annexation stance that cost them support in the 
South. So, while the actual roll-call vote on the joint 
resolution seemed to support a vibrant party system, the wheels 
of change had already set in motion the movement for. 
sectionalism to replace partisan loyalty as the prime 
consideration of voters and politicians.132
13°Richmond Whig, 1 November 1844, cited in Cooper, South and the 
Politics of Slavery, p. 225.
131Cooper, South and the Politics of Slavery, p. 218.
132Smith, Annexation of Texas, pp. 345-347. In the final Senate 
vote, annexation was approved by the margin 27-25, with three Whigs 
crossing party lines to support it. Similarly, in the House vote of 
132-76, only one Whig supported the measure and two Democrats opposed 
it.
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